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Episodic memory is the memory for experienced events. A peak competence of episodic memory is the
mental combination of events to infer commonalities. Inferring commonalities may proceed with and without
consciousness of events. Yet what distinguishes conscious from unconscious inference? This question
inspired nine experiments that featured strongly and weakly masked cartoon clips presented for uncon-
scious and conscious inference. Each clip featured a scene with a visually impenetrable hiding place. Five
animals crossed the scene one-by-one consecutively. One animal trajectory represented one event. The an-
imals moved through the hiding place, where they might linger or not. The participants’ task was to observe
the animals’ entrances and exits to maintain amental record of which animals hid simultaneously. Wemanip-
ulated information load to explore capacity limits. Memory of inferences was tested immediately, 3.5 or 6min
following encoding. The participants retrieved inferences well when encoding was conscious. When encod-
ingwas unconscious, the participants needed to respond intuitively. Only habitually intuitive decisionmakers
exhibited a significant delayed retrieval of inferences drawn unconsciously. Their unconscious retrieval per-
formance did not drop significantly with increasing information load, while conscious retrieval performance
dropped significantly. A working memory network, including hippocampus, was activated during both
conscious and unconscious inference and correlated with retrieval success. An episodic retrieval network,
including hippocampus, was activated during both conscious and unconscious retrieval of inferences and
correlated with retrieval success. Only conscious encoding/retrieval recruited additional brain regions
outside these networks. Hence, levels of consciousness influenced the memories’ behavioral impact, mem-
ory capacity, and the neural representational code.
INTRODUCTION
To make sense of the world, we need to remember what
happened where and when. We also need to combine experi-
ences using inferential reasoning1 to detect commonalities or re-
lations between them. Remembering experienced episodes and
inferential reasoning require episodic memory and the hippo-
campus.2 For example, we can use episodic memory while
sitting outside a cave to infer which tourists visit the cave simul-
taneously, based on our mental record of the tourists’ entrance
and exit times. The mental computations that allow drawing in-
ferences are (1) one-shot encoding (a person enters/exits the
cave only once), (2) forming individual pairwise associations
(tourist A is the first to enter the cave, tourist B is the second
.), and (3) identifying temporal overlaps of cave visitors (noticing
which tourists lingered in the cave simultaneously).3–8 Cohen
and Eichenbaum3 suggested that episodic memory entails
both the ability to encode individual associations between items
and the capacity to expressmemories flexibly through inference,
as in the cave example. Findings indicate that drawing infer-
ences by forming associations indirectly (not based on
sensory input) requires both episodic memory and working
memory.9–15 Here, we probe the formation and delayed retrieval
of inferences to assess the role of consciousness in episodic
memory and working memory.
Encoding events and drawing inferences appear associated
with consciousness. However, consciousness of event percep-
tion is a debated precondition for episodic encoding,3,4,16–19
inferential reasoning,20 and working memory.21 According to
textbooks, human episodic memory, and hippocampal process-
ing belong to declarative/explicit memory and depend on con-
sciousness.16,18,19,22 This notion derives from amnesic patients
with hippocampal damage, who exhibited impaired conscious
episodic learning but preserved unconscious learning, e.g., skill
acquisition, priming, and conditioning.2,17–19 Importantly, inves-
tigators probed episodic memory using consciously accessible
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learning material without obviating consciousness to see
whether unconscious episodic encoding would also operate in
volunteers and would decrease following hippocampal damage.
That consciousness is required for episodic and hippocampal
encoding is therefore an empirically unfounded belief. Strict tests
of this belief necessitate (supra)liminal encoding in participants
during deep sleep, coma, or anesthesia or subliminal encoding
in wake participants. Experiments using both of these ap-
proaches revealed that hippocampal-assisted episodic
encoding operates with and without consciousness.23–28 These
findings confirm newer theoretical claims3,4,8 that the sole prem-
ise for episodic encoding through hippocampus is not con-
sciousness but a task that calls upon the core computational
competence of the hippocampus, namely, the rapid formation
of new and flexible associations. When applying such tasks, un-
conscious episodic encoding and retrieval was revealed using
subliminal word pairs,23,29,30 subliminal face-word pairs,24,31–33
and subliminal objects in space.26 Moreover, participants in-
ferred unconsciously that two ordinarily unrelated words A-C
are semantically related based on the preceding subliminal
encoding of discontinuously flashed subliminal word pairs A-B
and B-C.34,35 Furthermore, subliminal associative encoding
encompassed the encoding of complex visuospatial second-or-
der sequences,36 the understanding of causal events,37 and nar-
ratives from spatial-temporal movement patterns.38 Intriguingly,
the hippocampus was not only activated during subliminal
associative encoding and unconscious retrieval24,30,33,35 but
hippocampal damage also impeded subliminal associative
encoding.23 Even in the unconscious state of deep sleep did
participants form and store into wakefulness lexical-semantic
associations unconsciously.28 These findings question the text-
book account of memory2,17–19 and support the relational mem-
ory account3 and the processing account of memory systems.4
The finding of an unconscious besides the known conscious
form of episodic memory raises the question of how the two
differ. Here, we address this question by contrasting conscious
and unconscious encoding/retrieval of cartoon clips.We created
a memory task that requires the continuous updating of informa-
tion and the drawing of temporal relational inferences while
watching a clip (Figure 1). We presented strongly and weakly
masked clips for unconscious and conscious encoding, respec-
tively. We informed participants of subliminal clips before exper-
imentation to match instructions between consciousness levels.
Each clip presented a scene with a visually impenetrable hiding
Figure 1. Experimental designs
(A) The current research consists of three parts. In part one, information load was manipulated in three levels (low, medium, high). In part two, we replicated the
experiment with strongmasking and amedium information load. In part three, we performed two fMRI experiments—one with strongmasking and one with weak
masking—and with a medium information load. N, numbers of participants.
(B) Strong and weak masking. For strong masking, masks were filled with colored pixels. For weak masking, masks were uniform gray.
(C) Manipulation of information load and encoding-test interval. The low load condition consisted of 36 short encoding-test runs, the medium load condition
consisted of 12 encoding-test runs, and the high load condition consisted of four encoding-test runs. Question marks indicate retrieval testing; each box with a
question mark stands for the ten consecutively administered retrieval trials that pertain to one clip. E, experimental condition; C1, control condition 1; C2, control
condition 2. See Video S1 for an impression of the masked cartoon clips.
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place and five animals that entered and left the hiding place
consecutively (Video S1). All animals moved through the hiding
place and left it immediately or lingered inside potentially
meeting other animals. The participants’ task was to encode
the time points of the animals’ entrances and exits to infer which
animals resided in the hiding place simultaneously. Drawing in-
ferences while encoding animal trajectories requires Piagetian
object permanence39 and conscious/unconscious working
memory.40,41 Outputs of working memory needed to be stored
long term. Wemanipulated information load by presenting either
one single clip for encoding and immediate retrieval, three clips
for encoding and delayed retrieval, or nine clips for encoding and
very delayed retrieval (Figure 1).
This experimental design allows testing several hypotheses.
Given the alignment of task demands, instructions, and learning
materials between consciousness levels, we anticipated brain
activations in a common working memory network during
conscious and unconscious inferential reasoning while watching
clips and in an episodic retrieval network during the conscious
and unconscious retrieval of inferences. We hypothesized the
hippocampus to mediate both the formation and the retrieval
of inferences.42–45 Because visual input is stronger during supra-
liminal versus subliminal encoding, we expected steeper local
maxima in brain activation and broader activation clusters during
conscious versus unconscious processing.23,35,46–50 We also
hypothesized that unconscious retrieval performance would
remain stable with increasing information load,23,24,26,29–35 while
conscious retrieval performance would drop. Finally, we
measured the participants’ habitual decision style—intuitive
versus deliberative—to account for the possibility that habitually
intuitive decision makers would outperform deliberative decision
makers in the unconscious condition that required intuitive
decisions at test.26,51 Directly comparing conscious with
unconscious processing in episodic memory will advance the
relational3 and processing account of memory systems4
because results reveal how conscious differs from unconscious
episodic processing.
RESULTS
Overview of results in the three parts of this research
The current research consists of three parts that all include the
same experimental task (Figure 1): drawing temporal relational
inferences while watching cartoon clips and retrieving these in-
ferences at test. The first part of this research features six behav-
ioral experiments with manipulated information load, in which
cartoon clips were either presented strongly or weakly masked
for unconscious or conscious encoding with low/medium/high
information load. The second part of this research features a
behavioral replication experiment with strongmasking and ame-
dium information load. The third part of this research features
two experiments with functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) and a medium information load. One experiment included
strongly masked cartoon clips and the other weakly masked
cartoon clips (Figure 1). Table S1 gives values for two-tailed
one-sample t tests computed against chance level (chance level
of accuracy: 0.50; chance level of DRT correct – incorrect: 0.00)
for each condition and each experiment.
Following experiments featuring strong masking, we carried
out an objective test of clip awareness to ascertain the level of
(un)consciousness of clip perception. In addition to this objective
awareness measure, participants rated their conscious aware-
ness of each cartoon clip following its presentation using the
perceptual awareness scale (PAS;52). PAS results are presented
at the end of the results section. The results of the objective
awareness tests are presented in the STAR Methods.
Figure 2. A decision task served as a retrieval test of previously drawn inferences
At encoding, the participants’ task was to observe the animals’ entrances and exits to maintain a mental record of which animals resided inside the hiding place
simultaneously. For retrieval testing, participants were presented with the unmasked images of a clip’s hiding place and two animals for conscious inspection to
decide based on conscious knowledge (following weak masking) or based on intuition (following strong masking) whether the two animals lingered simulta-
neously inside the hiding place or not. See Video S1 for an impression of the masked cartoon clips.
ll
OPEN ACCESS
Current Biology 31, 1–13, August 23, 2021 3
Please cite this article in press as: Schneider et al., Larger capacity for unconscious versus conscious episodic memory, Current Biology (2021),
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2021.06.012
Article
First part of this research: Six behavioral experiments
with manipulated information load
Inferences drawn during clip encoding needed to be retained
for retrieval testing. A retrieval test trial consisted of the
unmasked presentation of a clip’s hiding place plus the un-
masked images of two animals that had featured in the
respective clip. There were ten retrieval trials per clip. We
used a direct, explicit retrieval instruction in both conscious-
ness conditions. The participants’ task was to decide whether
the two animals had hidden simultaneously or not in the pre-
sented hiding place (responses by manual button press).
Following strong masking, participants were asked to rely on
intuition. The average percentage of retrieval trials that
call for a ‘‘simultaneous’’ response was 50%. We expected
longer response latencies for incorrect versus correct retrieval
responses in both consciousness conditions. This reaction
time difference can reveal the presence of unconscious mem-
ory traces even when response accuracy is at chance
level.24,31,53 Accuracy (percentage of correct responses)
and the reaction time (RT) difference between the median
RT of incorrect and correct retrieval responses served
as dependent variables. We computed t tests to obtain
overall results (Table S1) and computed analyses of variance
(ANOVA) with the between-subjects factors information load
(IL; low load, medium load, high load) and decision style
(DS; intuitive/deliberative). Figure 3 provides an overview of
results and Figures S1 and S2 distributions of retrieval accu-
racy and RT differences.
Experiments with strong masking for unconscious
encoding
Accuracy
The overall t test indicates that participants’ retrieval perfor-
mance did not exceed chance level (MAcc = 50.20%, SEAcc =
0.43%; t(116) = 0.463, p = 0.644, dZ = 0.042). The ANOVA
indicates that IL and DS failed to influence retrieval performance
significantly: FIL(2, 111) = 0.33, p = 0.721; FDS(1, 111) = 1.05, p =
0.307; FILxDS(2, 111) = 0.27, p = 0.766. Bayes analyses confirmed
that retrieval performancewas at chance level. In all IL conditions
and for both DS groups, Bayes factors were <0.30, which is sub-
stantial evidence for the H0 assumption of chance level perfor-
mance. Only deliberative decision makers in the high-load con-
dition had a BF >1/3 (BF = 1.26) suggesting that the data could
not properly discriminate between H0 and H1. BFs were calcu-
lated with the R54 function provided by Baguley55 using a half-
normal prior distribution with a mode of 0% (reflecting chance-
level accuracy) and a standard deviation of 5% (expected above
chance accuracy based on previous research).56 Chance-level
retrieval performance attests to the results of the objective
awareness test (reported in the STARMethods) that participants
were unable to process the strongly masked clips using
conscious awareness (Tables S1 and S6; Figure S1).
Reaction time difference
The overall t test shows that participants’ reaction times did
not distinguish significantly between correct and incorrect
retrieval responses (MDRT = 19 ms, SE = 18 ms; t(116) =
1.032, p = 0.304, dZ = 0.095). The ANOVA indicates that IL
had no significant influence on the RT difference (FIL(2,111) <
0.001, p = 0.996, h2r < 0.001) but DS had (FDS(1,111) = 5.75,
p = 0.018, h2r = 0.049). Namely, intuitive decision makers
gave correct retrieval responses significantly faster than incor-
rect retrieval responses (MDRT = 60 ms, SE = 21 ms; t(61) =
2.869, p = 0.006, dZ = 0.36). Importantly, this result was not
significantly modulated by IL (FIL (2,59) = 0.38, p = 0.685) (Fig-
ures 3 and S2). The deliberative decision makers did not give
correct retrieval responses significantly faster than incorrect
retrieval responses (MDRT = 29 ms, SE = 29 ms; t(54) =
0.989, p = 0.327, dZ = 0.133).
No association between accuracy and reaction time difference
Figure 3. Retrieval performance in all experiments
Top panel: conscious retrieval following the encoding of weakly masked clips (mean % correct responses; chance level = 50%). Bottom panel: unconscious
retrieval following the encoding of strongly masked clips (difference in reaction times,DRT: incorrect minus correct retrieval responses). Error bars represent one
standard error of the mean. See also Figures S1–S3 as well as Tables S1 and S6.
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Retrieval accuracy was not significantly related to the RT differ-
ence between incorrect and correct retrieval responses (r(115) =
0.001, p = 0.989; both measures were centered by the mean of
the respective load condition). Furthermore, neither load nor
decision style modulated the relation between accuracy and
RT difference (all p > 0.18 in a linear model with RT difference
as dependent variable and with the predictors accuracy, load,
DS, and all interaction terms; only DS was significant:
FDS(1,105) = 6.27, p = 0.014). Hence, a potential residual stim-
ulus awareness of participants with high accuracy scores did
not significantly contribute to the reported RT difference (the
measure of implicit memory), neither in intuitive nor in delibera-
tive decision makers.
Experiments with weakmasking for conscious encoding
Accuracy
The overall t test shows that participants’ retrieval performance
was well above chance level (MAcc = 74.12%, SEAcc = 1.21%,
chance level 50%; t(106) = 19.994, p < 0.001, d = 5.940). Notably,
the ANOVA indicates that IL affected participants’ retrieval
performance: FIL(2, 101) = 30.62, p < 0.001, h
2
r = 0.378. Namely,
participants performed significantly worse in the high load (HL)
condition (MAcc = 63.88%) compared to the low load (LL) condi-
tion (MAcc = 81.63%; t(69) =7.772, p < 0.001, dS =1.849) and
also compared to the medium load (ML) condition (MAcc =
78.06%; t(72) = 5.671, p < 0.001, dS = 1.319) (Figures 3 and
S1). The comparison between the ML and the LL conditions
yielded no significant result: t(67) = 1.622, p = 0.110, dS =
0.391. The ANOVA suggests that DS had no significant influence
on retrieval performance (FDS(1,101) = 0.77, p = 0.383), and DS
did not interact significantly with IL (FILxDS(2,101) = 0.21, p =
0.808).
Reaction time difference
The overall t test reveals that participants gave correct retrieval
responses significantly faster than incorrect retrieval responses
(MDRT = 556 ms, SE = 62 ms; t(106) = 8.959, p < 0.001, dZ =
0.866). The ANOVA indicates that IL tended to influence themea-
sure of the RT difference: FIL (2,101) = 2.99, p = 0.055, h
2
r = 0.056.
The greater speed of correct versus incorrect responses dimin-
ished when information load was high (LL: MDRT = 603 ms,
SE = 107 ms; ML: MDRT = 722 ms, SE = 130 ms; HL: MDRT =
358 ms, SE = 74 ms). The RT difference tended to be smaller
in the HL compared to the LL condition (t (69) = 1.919, p =
0.059, dS = 0.457) and was significantly smaller in the HL
compared to the ML condition (t (72) = 2.466, p = 0.016, dS =
0.574), but not in the ML compared to the LL condition
(t (67) = 0.697, p = 0.488, dS = 0.168) (Figure S2). Decision style
exerted no significant influence on the RT difference
(FDS(1,101) = 0.49, p = 0.486) and did not interact significantly
with information load (FILxDS(2,101) = 0.13, p = 0.875).
Association between accuracy and reaction time difference
Retrieval accuracy predicted significantly reaction time differ-
ences between incorrect and correct retrieval responses
(r(105) = 0.321, p < 0.001; both measures were centered by the
mean of the respective load condition). The association between
accuracy and RT differences was not significantly affected by
load or DS (all p > 0.20 in a linear model with RT difference as
dependent variable and with the predictors accuracy, load,
DS, and all interaction terms; only the main effect accuracy
was significant: FACC = 10.98, p = 0.001). This suggests that
the magnitude of the difference in reaction times between incor-
rect and correct responses reliably mirrored individual differ-
ences in conscious retrieval performance independently of DS
and load.
Is a high information load associated with more
forgettingwhenmasking isweak (conscious processing)
versus strong (unconscious processing)?
We contrasted the two consciousness conditions directly
regarding the relative drop in retrieval performance from the me-
dium to the high load condition. We limited this analysis to intu-
itive decision -makers because only these participants showed
implicit retrieval effects in the strongly masked conditions. To
compute a two-factorial ANOVA on the z-standardized retrieval
data, we pooled and z-standardized the intuitive decision
makers’ retrieval data (percentage of correct responses) ac-
quired following weak masking. We did the same for the intuitive
decision makers’ retrieval data acquired following strong mask-
ing (RT difference between incorrect and correct responses).
The ANOVA with the z-standardized values as dependent vari-
able and the independent variables masking (strong versus
weak) and IL (low, medium, high) yielded a significant interaction
between IL and masking: FILxM(2,113) = 6.88, p = 0.002, h
2
r =
0.109. Retrieval performance dropped significantly from the
ML to the HL condition following weak masking (t(41) =
2.198, p = 0.034, dS = 0.671), but not following strong mask-
ing (t(43) = 0.441, p = 0.661, dS = 0.132).
Second part of this research: Replication experiment
with medium information load and strong masking for
unconscious encoding
Before running fMRI experiments, we wished to replicate the un-
conscious retrieval effect with medium load in intuitive decision
makers. We ran the medium load version of the experiment
with strongmasking in new participants that had either a deliber-
ative or intuitive decision style.
Accuracy
The overall t test suggests that participants’ percentage of cor-
rect retrieval responses were not significantly above chance
level (MAcc = 50.10%, SEAcc = 0.61%; t(47) = 0.172, p = 0.864,
dZ = 0.025). DS did not influence retrieval accuracy significantly:
t(46) = 0.799, p = 0.428 dS = 0.231 (Figure S1). Bayes factors for
both DS groups were <0.23, which is substantial evidence for the
null assumption of chance-level performance.
Reaction time difference
The overall t test revealed significantly shorter reaction times for
correct than incorrect retrieval responses (MDRT = 35 ms, SE =
16 ms; t(47) = 2.156, p = 0.036, dZ = 0.311). DS did not influence
the size of the RT difference significantly (t(46) = 1.313, p = 0.196,
dS = 0.379), although intuitive decision makers (MDRT = 56 ms,
SE = 20 ms) presented with a larger RT difference than deliber-
ative decision makers (MDRT = 14 ms, SE = 25 ms). The intuitive
decision makers’ RT difference was larger than zero (t(23) =
2.786, p = 0.011, dZ = 0.569), while the deliberative decision
makers’ RT difference did not differ significantly from zero
(t(23) = 0.551, p = 587, dZ = 0.112) (Figures 3 and S2). We
computed the Bayes factor to quantify the evidence in favor of
the hypothesized RT difference, as observed in the first part of
this research with a medium information load, versus the null hy-
pothesis of no RT difference. As recommended by Dienes,57,58
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we chose a half-normal prior distribution with a mode of 0 and a
standard deviation of 82 ms, which corresponds to the effect
size of the intuitive decision makers in the initial experiment. Us-
ing the Bayes factor function for R54 provided by Baguley,55 the
resulting Bayes factor for the performance of intuitive decision
makers was 19.10. This factor speaks in favor of an RT difference
for intuitive decision makers as observed in the medium load
experiment in the first part of this research. The Bayes factor
for deliberative decision makers was 0.473, which is inconclu-
sive but tends to favor the null assumption of no difference be-
tween RTs for correct versus incorrect retrieval responses.
No association between accuracy and reaction time
difference
Retrieval accuracy was not related significantly to RT differences
between incorrect and correct retrieval responses (r(46) =
–0.058, p = 0.694). Furthermore, DS had no significant influence
on the relation between accuracy and RT difference (all p > 0.185
in a linear model with the predictors accuracy, DS, and the inter-
action term accuracy3DS). Hence, a potential residual stimulus
awareness of participants with high accuracy scores did not
contribute significantly to the reported RT difference (the mea-
sure of implicit memory), neither in intuitive nor in deliberative de-
cision makers.
Third part of this research: fMRI experiments with
strongly andweaklymasked cartoon clips and amedium
information load
We recorded the fMRI BOLD signal during both encoding and
retrieval. One fMRI experiment included weakly masked clips
for conscious encoding and the other fMRI experiment strongly
masked clips for unconscious encoding. Based on previous
evidence,24,59 we expected the hippocampus to be activated
during both conscious and unconscious encoding and retrieval.
We recruited exclusively intuitive decision makers for both
experiments.
Behavioral results
Experiment with strong masking for unconscious encoding
The percentage of correct retrieval responses was not better
than chance (MAcc = 49.51%, SE = 0.91%; t(23) = 0.540, p =
0.595, dZ = 0.110) (Figure S1). The Bayes factor was 0.12,
which is substantial evidence for the null assumption of
chance-level performance. However, participants exhibited
significantly shorter reaction times for correct versus incorrect
retrieval responses (MDRT = 81 ms, SE = 31 ms; t(23) = 2.600,
p = 0.016, dZ = 0.531) (Figures 3 and S2). We computed the
Bayes factor to quantify the evidence in favor of a null effect
versus an RT difference of the size observed in the medium
load experiment of the first part of this research. We used the
same half-normal prior distribution as in part two of this research
(mode of 0, SD = 82ms). The Bayes factor for the obtained effect
was 13.92, which speaks in favor of an RT difference as
observed in the medium load experiment of the first part of this
research.
No association between accuracy and reaction time difference
for unconscious retrieval
Retrieval accuracy was not related to RT differences (r(22) =
0.129, p = 0.547). Hence, a potential residual stimulus awareness
of participants with high accuracy scores did not contribute to
the reported RT difference.
Experiment with weak masking for conscious encoding
The percentage of correct retrieval responseswas above chance
(MAcc = 75.67%, SEAcc = 1.75%; t(23) = 14.642, p < 0.001, dZ =
2.989) (Figures 3 and S1). Participants exhibited significantly
shorter reaction times for correct versus incorrect retrieval re-
sponses (MDRT = 458 ms, SE = 58 ms; t(23) = 7.870, p < 0.001,
dZ = 1.606) (Figure S2).
Association between accuracy and reaction time difference for
conscious retrieval
Retrieval accuracy predicted the reaction time differences
(r(22) = 0.531, p = 0.008).
Note concerning the retrieval-related reaction time
differences following the encoding of strongly masked
clips
To legitimate an interpretation of reaction time differences in
terms of unconscious inferential reasoning and unconscious
retrieval of inferences, we considered alternative explanations
for the reaction time differences, such as biases in the stimulus
material and response biases. These additional analyses are re-
ported in the STARMethods. Results indicate that the difference
in reaction times can neither be explained by biases in the stim-
ulus material nor by a participant response bias.
fMRI results: Control conditions
We had implemented two control conditions in the experimental
design used in all parts of this research, but these control condi-
tions are only relevant for the analysis of the fMRI data. In control
condition 1, five animals crossed the scene one by one moving
through the hiding place without lingering inside. This circum-
stance alleviates the need for temporal relational inference and
leaves the encoding of the sequence of the appearance of five
animals. In control condition 2, a cartoon clip featured one single
animal crossing the scene five times in the same direction, mov-
ing straight through the hiding place. The comparison between
the experimental condition and control condition 1 allows
isolating BOLD signal underlying temporal relational inference.
The comparison between control condition 1 and control condi-
tion 2 allows isolating BOLD signal underlying the encoding of a
temporal sequence.
Brain areas exhibiting encoding- and retrieval-related activity
increases that are common to conscious and unconscious
processing
We computed conjunction analyses of positive brain-behavior
correlations that had been computed for each experiment (see
STAR Methods for results and Tables S2 and S3). In the encod-
ing fMRI time series, we used a block design (one block corre-
sponds to one clip) and contrasted the experimental condition
with control condition 1. We then correlated this contrast with
retrieval performance (strongly masked clips: RT difference;
weakly masked clips: retrieval accuracy) between subjects to
reveal signal associated with temporal relational inference and
retrieval success. In the retrieval fMRI time series, we used a
rapid event-related design that allowed contrasting correct
versus incorrect retrieval responses in the experimental condi-
tion. We computed the contrast of correct versus incorrect
retrieval responses and correlated this contrast with retrieval
performance (strongly masked clips: RT difference; weakly
masked clips: retrieval accuracy) between subjects.
The right posterior hippocampus was the only brain region that
featured both in the encoding-related conjunction (6 voxels,
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peak at MNI 30, 38, 4; T = 2.10; puncor < 0.005) and in the
retrieval-related conjunction (15 voxels, peak at MNI = 32,
34, 6; T = 2.77; puncor < 0.005) (Figure 4; Table S4).
The encoding-related conjunction analysis yielded further re-
gions of commonly increased activity that correlated with
retrieval success, namely, regions in right prefrontal cortex.
The significant clusters were located in the right superior frontal
gyrus (BA8; 16 voxels, peak at 8, 30, 34; T = 2.25; puncor < 0.001),
the right middle frontal gyrus (BA10; 24 voxels, peak at 28, 48, 6;
T = 2.46; puncor < 0.001), the right anterior cingulate gyrus (BA32;
20 voxels, peak at 12, 36, 18; T = 2.38; puncor < 0.001), and the
right claustrum (13 voxels, peak at 30, 0, 10; T = 2.20; puncor <
0.001) (Table S4). The conjunction analysis of the inverse corre-
lations yielded no significant results.
The retrieval-related conjunction analysis yielded many
further (apart from the right posterior hippocampus) regions
of commonly increased activity that correlated with retrieval
success. The significant clusters were located in the following
regions (Table S4): bilateral anterior hippocampus (left side: 67
voxels, peak at MNI 28, 22, 20; T = 3.04; right side: 41
voxels, peak at MNI 34, 22, 18; T = 2.36; puncor < 0.005)
(Figure 4), bilateral parahippocampal gyri, bilateral lingual
and fusiform gyri, bilateral middle temporal gyri, left medial,
middle and inferior frontal gyri, left supramarginal gyrus, right
precuneus, bilateral cuneus, and bilateral occipital gyri. The
conjunction analysis of the inverse correlations yielded no sig-
nificant results.
The strength of the correlation results illustrated in Figure 4 did
not differ significantly between consciousness levels. This was
true for both encoding (right posterior hippocampus, compari-
son between rconscious = 0.44 and runconscious = 0.40; Fisher’s
z = 0.175, p = 0.86, Zou’s 95% CI: [–0.45–0.54]) and retrieval
(left anterior hippocampus, comparison between rconscious =
0.44 and runconscious = 0.60; Fisher’s z = 0.683, p = 0.49,
Zou’s 95% CI: [–0.60–0.28]). Hence, the relationship between
hippocampal activity and retrieval performance did not differ
significantly between conscious and unconscious processing.
When removing outliers from the brain-behavior correlations
(STAR Methods), the hippocampal clusters depicted in Figure 4
remained statistically significant with the exception of the
retrieval-related cluster situated in the right anterior hippocam-
pus with its peak at MNI = 34, 22, 18.
Brain areas exhibiting stronger, broader, or additional encod-
ing- and retrieval-related activity increases during conscious
versus unconscious processing
We had expected conscious versus unconscious processing
to be paralleled by enhanced fMRI signal increases. To reveal
signal differences between consciousness conditions, we
computed contrasts at the second level between encoding- or
retrieval-related contrasts at the first level (see STAR Methods
for first-level results).
Conscious versus unconscious temporal relational inference
yielded signal increases in brain areas that were not commonly
activated, namely in Broca’s area in the left inferior frontal gyrus
Encoding Conjunction: Conscious ∧ Unconscious
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Figure 4. Brain areas exhibiting encoding- and retrieval-related activity increases that are common to conscious and unconscious process-
ing (conjunction analyses)
The top panel presents positive brain-behavior correlations in the right posterior hippocampus pertaining to the unconscious and conscious drawing of inferences
while watching strongly andweaklymasked clips. The bottompanel presents positive brain-behavior correlations in the left anterior hippocampus (also visible are
right anterior and right posterior hippocampal results) pertaining to the unconscious and conscious retrieval of the formed inferences. Conjunction results are
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(BA45; 203 voxels, peak at MNI 42, 34, 18; T = 4.36; puncor <
0.001) and its homotopic area in the right inferior frontal gyrus
(BA45; 17 voxels, peak at MNI 48, 36, 22; T = 3.64; puncor <
0.001) (Figure 5). A further cluster was located in the right thal-
amus (29 voxels, peak at MNI 4, 10, 4; T = 4.14; puncor <
0.001) (Table S5). The inverse contrast yielded no significant
result. That is, no brain area exhibited increased signal during un-
conscious versus conscious temporal relation inference.
The conscious versus unconscious retrieval of the formed in-
ferences yielded signal increases in (1) regions that were
commonly activated and (2) in regions adjacent to commonly
activated regions, and (3) in regions that were outside the
commonly activated regions (Table S5). (1) The enhanced signal
in commonly activated regions was located in the right middle
temporal gyrus (BA21) and the left anterior hippocampus (Fig-
ure 5; Table S5). (2) Enhanced signal in regions adjacent to
commonly activated regions was located in bilateral middle fron-
tal gyri (BA10), left middle frontal gyrus (BA46), bilateral middle
temporal gyri (BA21), bilateral superior temporal gyri (BA22),
and bilateral anterior hippocampi (Figure 5). (3) Enhanced signal
in regions outside the commonly activated regions was located
in the right anterior cingulate gyrus (BA24 and 32), right middle
(BA10) and inferior frontal gyrus (BA47), right amygdala and bilat-
eral entorhinal cortex, right claustrum, left pre- and postcentral
gyrus, right supramarginal gyrus (BA40), left superior parietal
lobule (BA7), and the left posterior hippocampus (Figure 5; Table
S5). The inverse contrast yielded no significant result.That is, no
brain area exhibited increased signal during unconscious versus
conscious retrieval (Table S5).
Any conscious awareness of the strongly masked
cartoon clips?
Participants rated their conscious awareness of clips following
the presentation of each clip using the 4-point perceptual aware-
ness scale (PAS;52), where (1) means no awareness, (2) means a
vague feeling that something was present, (3) means an impres-
sion of a scene or animal, and (4) means a clear percept of a
scene and animals. A rating of 1 was given to 93.5% of all
strongly masked clips. Most participants (68.3%) rated all of
the strongly masked clips with a 1. Table S6 provides PAS rat-
ings. The qualitative pattern of the behavioral results remained
unchanged if strongly masked trials that received a PAS rating
>1 were excluded from data analysis. Hence, the above-re-
ported behavioral results originate from genuinely unconscious
clip processing. In addition, results obtained on the objective
awareness tests also indicate that participants had processed
the strongly masked clips unconsciously (STAR Methods).
DISCUSSION
Making sense of the world presumes that we combine distinct
events to infer commonalities and relations between events
through inferential reasoning, which depends on episodic and
working memory and involves the hippocampus.1 Here, we
Encoding Contrast: Conscious > Unconscious













Figure 5. Enhanced signal increases during conscious versus unconscious processing
Top panel: conscious versus unconscious temporal relational inference at encoding was paralleled by bilateral signal increases in the inferior frontal gyrus.
Bottom panel: the conscious versus unconscious retrieval of the formed inferences was paralleled by signal increases in bilateral anterior hippocampus and the
left posterior hippocampus. See also Table S5.
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observed successful conscious and unconscious temporal rela-
tional inference and a successful delayed retrieval of inferences.
Delayed retrieval performance was strong in the conscious but
weak in the unconscious condition. Unconscious retrieval per-
formance remained significant when information load increased,
while conscious retrieval performance dropped. Conscious and
unconscious inference were paralleled by activity increases in
the right prefrontal cortex and hippocampus, which correlated
with retrieval success. The delayed conscious and unconscious
retrieval of inferences was paralleled by activity increases in an
episodic memory retrieval network, which also correlated with
retrieval success. Conscious versus unconscious processing
spawned steeper activity increases and broader activation clus-
ters within commonly activated regions and beyond.
A notorious concern with subliminal experiments pertains to
the efficacy of the masking protocol. Therefore, we had applied
both an online subjective and a delayed objectivemeasure of clip
awareness. Participants gave a subjective awareness rating on a
perceptual awareness scale52 following each clip presentation.
The objective measure of clip awareness consisted in
a forced-choice test given in a trial-by-trial encoding-immedi-
ate-test procedure applied following experimentation. Data
collected with both methods suggest that the psychophysics
in all subliminal experiments prohibited participants from gaining
conscious access to clips. Moreover, the absence of accuracy
effects and the absence of correlations between the implicit
and explicit retrieval measure in the subliminal experiments
also suggest unconscious clip processing.
We informed participants of subliminal clips before experi-
mentation to match instructions between consciousness levels.
Yet, by laying open the subliminal stimulation before encoding
and then asking participants to retrieve animal trajectories that
they could not see, we put participants in an unsettling situation.
Therefore, experimenters usually keep participants naive about
subliminal presentations and give them indirect retrieval instruc-
tions that introduce thememory test as amemory-unrelated new
task to obviate participants’ thinking back to the encoding situ-
ation. This procedure allows participants to adopt a relaxed,
nonintentional attitude, which improves subliminal stimulus pro-
cessing.51,60 When, as here, participants are informed of sublim-
inal stimuli and retrieval instructions are direct instead of indirect,
participants adopt a scrutinizing, intentional encoding, and
retrieval mode. Our participants have sometimes relied on com-
mon sense regarding which animals would normally choose
spending time together rather than on unconscious knowledge.
Although all participants may have had this inclination, previous
research revealed that particularly deliberative decision makers
prefer relying on consciously accessible knowledge.61 They
lower their motivation when asked to rely on intuition.62 Concor-
dantly, only habitually intuitive decision makers exhibited
retrieval effects in the present study. This result replicates the
previous result26 that only intuitive, but not deliberative, decision
makers draw from their unconscious object-in-space knowledge
at test.26 Involuntary eye movements recorded at test26 re-
vealed, however, that the deliberative decision makers could
spontaneously access their unconscious knowledge, although
they failed letting this knowledge guide their deliberate retrieval
responses. We cannot determine whether our deliberative deci-
sionmakers had also encoded the clips but then failed letting this
knowledge guide their retrieval responses or whether they simply
failed to encode the clips in the first place. Anyway, the limitation
of memory effects to intuition-experienced participants corrobo-
rates the general finding that intuition is positively related to im-
plicit learning from supraliminal63,64 and subliminal stimuli26 and
to dealing with a high information load.65–67
Implicit retrieval effects in the present study were limited to the
soft memory measure, the reaction time difference between cor-
rect and incorrect retrieval responses. The reaction time differ-
ence is a more subtle memory measure than response accuracy
and emerges not only in tests of unconscious memory24,34,53 but
also in tests of conscious memory.68–71 Correspondingly, incor-
rect retrieval responses took longer than correct retrieval re-
sponses in both consciousness conditions. This reaction time
difference may reflect a swift memory reactivation in correct re-
sponses subsequent to successful memory formation, although
this reactivation had not sufficed to impact on the direction of
retrieval responses in the unconscious condition. The reaction
time difference may also result from slow incorrect response
due to long search times, low confidence,72 and idling because
of poor memory formation. In any event, reaction times system-
atically separated between the two retrieval categories ‘‘correct’’
versus ‘‘incorrect,’’ which pertain to the relevant dimension: an-
imals that lingered simultaneously inside the hiding place or not.
With reaction times differentiating between the realities of animal
encounters, we must conclude that participants had drawn
temporal relational inferences unconsciously. The weakness of
the current compared to previous unconscious memory ef-
fects23,31,35 likely owes to task difficulty and to overt and direct
instead of covert and indirect instructions. The implicit effect
occurred in four experiments (experiments with medium and
high load, replication experiment with medium load, fMRI exper-
iment with medium load), which gives rise to the reality of an un-
conscious what-where-when encoding and delayed retrieval.
The instructed task during encoding was to watch five animals
entering and leaving a hiding place to determine which animals
lingered simultaneously inside the hiding place. Note that the
tested information—animals that lingered simultaneously in-
side—was never displayed but needed to be inferred. Therefore,
visual priming and visual familiarity cannot account for the stor-
age of animal encounters. The necessity of drawing temporal
relational inferences called upon mental imagery and working
memory because drawing inferences implicates the monitoring
of the time points of each animal’s entrance and exit and the con-
stant mental updating of the current number and appearance of
animals inside the hiding place. This constant updating must
have invoked the episodic buffer of working memory that de-
pends on the hippocampus.40,73 Indeed, activity rose within
the right posterior hippocampus during both the conscious and
unconscious drawing of inferences and this activity correlated
with retrieval success. In addition, regions of the right prefrontal
cortex were activated during conscious and unconscious infer-
ence, and this activation correlated with retrieval success. These
regions were located in the superior and middle frontal gyrus,
anterior cingulate gyrus, and the right claustrum, which had
been previously associated with visual-spatial working mem-
ory.74,75 The claustrum is strongly linked to prefrontal cortex,
helps in attending to salient sensory events, and facilitates exec-
utive functions that control posterior cortices.76,77 Such exigent
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unconscious working memory computations and corresponding
prefrontal activations exceed previous findings regarding an
unconscious form of working memory78–80 and inform theories
that firmly associate working memory with conscious stimulus
processing.40,41,81 These findings also challenge theories of
consciousness that consider conscious scene perception
necessary for the understanding of an unfolding event, for the
encoding of what-where-when associations, and for inferential
reasoning.81–86
Participants knew that they needed to store their inferences for
later retrieval. This requirement applied to the medium and high
load condition, where the encoding-test interval spanned 3.5
and 6 min, respectively. Both the conscious and unconscious
retrieval of inferences was accompanied by transcortical activity
increases that correlated with retrieval success. Results were
located in bilateral regions of the anterior and posterior hippo-
campus, parahippocampal gyrus, lingual and fusiform gyrus,
middle temporal gyrus, as well as unilateral left regions in the
medial, middle, and inferior frontal gyrus and the supramarginal
gyrus. These brain regions correspond to areas that had previ-
ously been associated with retrieval success for visual-spatial
episodic memories.87,88 This retrieval network comprises critical
hubs of the episodic retrieval network including bilateral hippo-
campus, which underscores our theoretical claim4 that the
episodic memory system and the hippocampus operate task ori-
ented and independently of conscious awareness. Reiterating
the above argument for a role of prefrontal cortices in higher
cognitive functions that run unconsciously, we point out that
left prefrontal cortices increased their activation level in a
retrieval-success-related mode along with many down-stream
cortical areas. Hence, specialized cortical processors of the hu-
man brain serve environmental demands irrespective of the or-
ganism’s conscious awareness of the environment with higher
cognitive functions and prefrontal processors making no excep-
tion to this rule.4,89,90
Although sharing the same memory systems, unconscious
differed from conscious memory formation: memories formed
from subliminal clips were weak and failed to direct retrieval re-
sponses, while memories formed from supraliminal clips were
strong and influenced retrieval responses. This difference in
thememories’ behavioral impact dovetails with underlying differ-
ences in brain activation. Conscious versus unconscious
processing spawned steeper activity increases and broader
activation clusters within commonly activated networks
including the hippocampus. This difference in strength likely
originated from differences in the visual signal emitted by weakly
versus strongly masked clips. Weak masking provides for a
stronger visual input with stronger visual cortex activation that in-
creases neural propagation strength and long-range coher-
ence.47,91 Yet, conscious versus unconscious processing was
also associated with activations in additional brain regions,
namely, bilateral Broca’s area during inferential reasoning and
right anterior cingulate gyrus, right middle and inferior frontal gy-
rus, right supramarginal gyrus, and left superior parietal lobule
during retrieval. The associated mental processes might corre-
spond to a verbal, in addition to the nonverbal, coding of animals
and strategic- and effort-related processes applied when
retrieval is conscious. A stronger recruitment of the visual system
and the episodic memory system, including the hippocampus,
during conscious versus unconscious encoding/retrieval does
not derogate the importance of these networks for unconscious
processing. In fact, the strength of encoding- and retrieval-
related brain-behavior correlations in the hippocampus (Figure 4)
did not differ significantly between the two consciousness
conditions.
The downside of the large behavioral impact of consciously
formed memories was a significant decline of retrieval accuracy,
when information load was high, while no significant decline was
observed for memories formed unconsciously. This result is
reminiscent of a hypothesis in computational neuroscience
postulating a larger memory capacity but poorer retrieval fidelity
for sparsely (perhaps unconsciously) versus thickly (perhaps
consciously) coded memories.92–95 Although fMRI does not
have the spatial resolution needed to track activity in single
neurons, we speculate that the neural memory traces underlying
individual unconscious (versus conscious) memories are less
susceptible to interference because they are sparse with distinct
neurons coding for distinct memories. In contrast, neural mem-
ory traces underlying individual conscious memories involve ac-
tivity in large neural assemblies with neurons coding for several
memories, which produces overlaps between memory traces
and breeds interference and forgetting.96–99 In conclusion, this
work suggests that unconscious episodic memory provides for
weak behavioral effects but comes with a large memory capac-
ity, while conscious episodic memory provides for strong behav-
ioral effects but comes with a small memory capacity.
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27. Züst, M.A., Colella, P., Reber, T.P., Vuilleumier, P., Hauf, M., Ruch, S.,
and Henke, K. (2015). Hippocampus is place of interaction between un-
conscious and conscious memories. PLoS ONE 10, e0122459.
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simultaneously inside a visually impenetrable hiding place. Hence, other than in previous masking experiments, we did not keep par-
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to experimentation. Of the 224 participants, 117 (age: 25.6 (mean) ± 4.9 (SD) years; 80 women) took part in the three subliminal
experiments with strong masking (LL: 33 participants; ML: 36 participants; HL: 48 participants). The remaining 107 participants
(age: 24.4 ± 4.5 years; 81 women) took part in the three supraliminal experiments with weak masking (LL: 33 participants; ML: 36
participants; HL: 38 participants). The study was approved by the local ethics committee.
Participants of the second part of this research
For the second part of this researchwe invited 48 new participants, of which 24were intuitive decision-makers (age 24.54 ± 4.8 years;
23 women) and 24 deliberative decision-makers (age 25.54 ± 4.539 years; 17 women). These participants reported normal or cor-
rected-to-normal visual acuity and a complete absence of previous and current neurological and psychiatric disease.
Participants of the third part of this research
Twenty-four participants were examined in the medium load experiment with strongly masked clips presented for unconscious en-
coding (age: 23.58 ± 3.49 years; 11 women) and 24 participants were examined in the medium load experiment with weakly masked
clips for conscious encoding (age: 24.00 ± 3.90 years; 20 women). All participants were right-handed according to the Chapman and
Chapman inventory.104 They reported normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and a complete absence of previous and current
neurological and psychiatric disease. All participants gave their written informed consent before experimentation.
METHOD DETAILS
The current research consists of three parts that all include the same experimental task, which involves the encoding of cartoon clips
and the drawing of temporal relational inferences that need to be stored for later retrieval. The first part of this research includes six
behavioral experiments withmanipulated information load. The cartoon clips were either presented strongly masked for unconscious
encoding with low/medium/high information load or weakly masked for conscious encoding with low/medium/high load. The second
part of this research comprises one behavioral replication experiment with strong masking for the unconscious encoding of cartoon
clips and a medium information load. The third part of this research includes two experiments with fMRI that feature the encoding of
cartoon clips with a medium information load; one fMRI experiment featured strongly masked cartoon clips for unconscious encod-
ing and the other fMRI experiment weakly masked cartoon clips for conscious encoding. In the following, we give methodological
details that concern all three parts of this research before we elaborate on each part separately.
Experimental conditions
Encoding
In all parts of this research, an experiment contained one experimental condition that required the cognitive capacity to draw tem-
poral relational inferences. Experiments in all parts of this research also contained two control conditions that did not require the
drawing of temporal relational inferences. The encoding part of all three conditions comprised the strongly or weakly masked pre-
sentation of cartoon clips. These clips featured either five animals (experimental condition and control condition 1) or one animal (con-
trol condition 2) that traversed a scene from left to right or from right to left. The five animals in the experimental condition and control
condition 1 crossed the scene once, one-by-one, moving through a visually impenetrable hiding place. Because the hiding place was
not equipped with peepholes or windows, animals were truly hidden in the hiding place such that participants could not perceive
them, neither in the condition with strong masking nor the condition with weak masking. In the experimental condition, an animal
could either step through the hiding place and exit it immediately or linger inside the hiding place and meet other animals that
had entered before or arrived afterward. Hence, while watching the experimental cartoon clip, participants needed to maintain a
mental record of which animals resided simultaneously inside the hiding place based on the temporal sequence of the five animals’
entrances and exits from the hiding place. This temporal relational inference task requires working memory. The five animals’ en-
trances and exits from the hiding place were orchestrated such that some but not all animals lingered inside the hiding place. In con-
trol condition 1, the five animals crossed the scene one-by-one moving through the hiding place without lingering inside. Hence, no
animals in control condition 1 ever hid simultaneously. This circumstance alleviated the need for a temporal relational inference and
left the simpler task of encoding five animals and the sequence of their appearance on the screen. Hence, the contrast of the exper-
imental condition with control condition 1 isolates neurocognitive processes underlying the drawing of temporal relational inferences.
In control condition 2, a cartoon clip featured one single animal crossing the scene five times in the same direction, moving straight
through the hiding place. The control conditions were included in all experiments in all parts of this research because they were de-
signed for the analyses performed on the fMRI data acquired in part three of this research. Please see Video S1 for an impression of
the visual experience in each consciousness condition.
Retrieval
The inferences drawn in the experimental condition needed to be retained for retrieval testing. The encoding-test interval was varied
in the first part of this research, along with the number of cartoon clips presented for encoding. A test trial consisted of the unmasked
presentation of a clip’s hiding place plus the unmasked images of two animals that had featured in the clip. Participants’ task was to
decide whether the two animals had hidden simultaneously or not in the respective clip (response by manual button press). There
were ten retrieval trials per clip because five animals featured in each experimental condition and each control condition 1 and
because each animal was presented with every other animal at test. Clips of the experimental condition were orchestrated such
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that the average percentage of retrieval trials that call for a ‘simultaneous’ response was 50%. There were also ten retrieval trials in
control condition 2, where only one animal had featured in the clip; this one animal was complemented with four new, not-previously-
presented animals on the forced-choice test. In the two control conditions, the correct response on the forced-choice test was a ‘not
simultaneous’ on each trial because animals had never hidden simultaneously inside the hiding place. When participants were obliv-
ious of clip contents because the clips had been presented stronglymasked for unconscious encoding, retrieval instructions fostered
an intuitive decision. When participants had been aware of clip contents because the clips were presented weakly masked for
conscious encoding, retrieval instructions fostered a conscious recall of inferences drawn when watching the clip. Participants in
both consciousness conditions were informed that on average 50% of the retrieval trials call for a ‘simultaneous’ response. Hence,
they were encouraged to give ‘simultaneous’ and ‘not simultaneous’ responses evenly. Please refer to Video S1.
Stimuli
We used 19 cartoon clips that consisted of colored, cartoon-style images of distinct scenes and animals drawn by two professional
Swiss artists. The 19 clips pictured unique scenes (underwater scene, mountain scene, ice landscape etc.), of which 18were used for
the experiment and one (the same one for all participants) for practicing before experimentation. Eleven animals were drawn to fit
each scene thematically (e.g., underwater scene: ray, orca, octopus, shark, etc.). Each scene was presented twice in the experiment,
though in two different conditions (experimental condition, control condition 1, control condition 2) and with distinct sets of five
animals. Of the 11 drawn animals, a set of five was used in the experimental condition and another set of five in control condition
1 (counterbalanced across participants), while the eleventh animal was always used in control condition 2. Hence, each animal ap-
peared in only one trial and condition. A clip consisted of 35 images. An image depicted either the scene alone or one single animal
crossing the scene. Seven of the 35 images presented the complete trajectory of one animal: three images displayed an animal’s
arrival in the scene and three images an animal’s exit; the image of the empty scene was presented for the time when an animal
lingered inside the hiding place. We counterbalanced across participants the order of the presentations of clips in a condition, the
order of conditions (experimental condition, control condition 1, control condition 2) presented in an experiment, and the assignment
of scenes to conditions (experimental condition, control condition 1, control condition 2).
Clip presentation
For the masked presentation of the clips, we adopted and modified the masking protocol used by Degonda et al.59 Clip frames (F)
were presented for 17 ms and masks (M) for 183 ms. Each clip frame was flanked by masks and repeated three times in sequence
before the next clip frame was flashed to continue an animal’s trajectory. Five adjacent masks initiated a clip, and one extra mask
terminated a clip. Accordingly, the frame order in a clip was M – M – M – M – M – F1 – M – F1 – M – F1 – M (.) M – F35 – M –
F35 – M – F35 – M – M. In the subliminal condition, we used pattern masks consisting of randomly arranged colored pixels to induce
a strong masking that impedes conscious frame perception. Because pattern masks interrupt the neural responses to previously
flashed images, the processing of the images does not reach consciousness.105,106 In the supraliminal condition, masks were uni-
formly gray to induce very weak masking that still allows for the conscious perception of each clip frame. Although clips were clearly
visible in the supraliminal condition, they appeared jerkily due to the intervening gray masks. Clips were consciously invisible in the
subliminal condition; the conscious impression of a clip consisted in a rapid change of masks. A complete clip consisted of 105 clip
frames plus 111 masks and lasted for 22.1 s. Please refer to Video S1 for an impression of the visual experience in each conscious-
ness condition.
Technical setup
Clips were presented with a BenQ MX764 DLP video projector using a resolution of 1024 3 768 pixels and a screen refresh rate of
60 Hz. Clips were projected onto a rear projection screen (PLEXIGLAS Optical by Evonik Industries) with a viewing angle of 16 width
and 9 height. Experiments were programmed using the MATLAB toolbox ‘‘Psychophysics Toolbox’’ Version 3.0.11 (http://
psychtoolbox.org/, parts 1 and 2 of this research) and using the software Presentation Version 11.3 (Neurobehavioral Systems,
http://www.neurobs.com, part 3 of this research). Responses were logged using a Cedrus Lumina Response Pad LS-PAIR
(https://www.cedrus.com/lumina).
Betsch personality inventory
We accommodated for the participants’ habitual decision style using the Betsch Preference for Intuition and Deliberation inven-
tory.107 Each participant filled out the inventory 24 hours before experimentation. The Betsch inventory consists of two independent
subscales that measure the preference to use intuition or deliberation when making decisions. Based on the difference between
scores obtained from the two subscales, we assigned participants to a group of intuitive or a group of deliberative decision-makers.26
The number of deliberative and intuitive decision-makers per condition is provided in Figure 1.
First part of this research: Six behavioral experiments with manipulated information load
Experimental procedure
In the LL, we presented a single cartoon clip for encoding with the ten respective retrieval trials following clip presentation after a few
seconds because a clip awareness rating intervened clip presentation and retrieval testing (Figure 1). The conscious visual impres-
sion in the strongly masked condition was of a 22 s-clip displaying a rapid sequence of pixel-masks. In the LL condition, information
load was low and long-termmemory was at most minimally engaged. In the ML condition, we presented three adjacent cartoon clips
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for encoding (one clip of the experimental condition, one clip of control condition 1, and one clip of control condition 2). The conscious
visual impression in the strongly masked condition was of three 22 s-clips, each clip displaying a rapid sequence of pixel-masks. A
rating of clip awareness was given following each clip. The adjacent presentation of three clips was meant to provide for a moderate
information load and to induce a moderate interference between clips during encoding and consolidation. A two-minute rest interval
separated the last clip awareness rating and the retrieval testing of the three clips. The ML condition spanned an encoding-test in-
terval of 3.5 minutes, which requires long-termmemory (Figure 1). In the HL condition, we presented nine adjacent clips for encoding
(three clips of the experimental condition, three clips of control condition 1, and three clips of control condition 2). Within subjects, a
fixed sequence of conditions was maintained, e.g., experimental condition (EC), control condition 1 (CC1), control condition 2 (CC2),
EC, CC1, CC2, EC, CC1, CC2. Between subjects, the sequence of conditions was varied systematically. The conscious visual
impression in the strongly masked condition was of nine 22 s-clips, each clip displaying a rapid sequence of pixel-masks. A rating
of clip awareness was given following each clip. The adjacent presentation of nine clips was meant to provide for a high information
load and to create substantial interference between clips during encoding and consolidation. A two-minute rest interval separated the
last clip awareness rating and the retrieval testing of the nine clips. The HL condition provided for an encoding-test interval spanning
at least 6 minutes, which requires long-term memory (Figure 1). The LL condition contained 36 encoding-test runs, the ML condition
12 encoding-test runs, and the HL condition four encoding-test runs.
The strongly (subliminal) and weakly (supraliminal) masked encoding parts were carried out with the same frame timing, same
frame sequence, same psychophysical conditions, and the same encoding instructions. The only difference between the sub-
liminal and supraliminal condition consisted in the filling of the masks (pattern mask versus uniform gray mask). However, the
wording of retrieval instructions differed between the strongly and weakly masked conditions. When participants were oblivious
of clip contents because the clips had been presented strongly masked for unconscious encoding, retrieval instructions
fostered an intuitive retrieval response. When participants had been aware of clip contents because the clips were presented
weakly masked for conscious encoding, retrieval instructions fostered a conscious recall of the inferences drawn when watch-
ing the clip.
Before experimentation, all participants practiced the task with two weakly masked (supraliminal) practice runs to become
familiar with the encoding material and encoding requirements. This supraliminal familiarization was also carried out with partici-
pants, who were scheduled for an experiment featuring strongly masked (subliminal) clips in order to give them an idea of the encod-
ing material and encoding requirements. If participants were scheduled for an experiment featuring strongly masked clips, the two
supraliminal practice runs were followed by two subliminal practice runs to accustom participants to the strongly masked presen-
tation mode.
Second part of this research: Replication experiment with medium information load and strong masking for
unconscious encoding
We examined whether the retrieval effect following strong clip masking and a medium information load was replicable before
applying this experimental design in the fMRI experiment planned for part three of this research. We ran again the medium load
version of the experiment with strong masking using the same protocol and procedure as in the initial experiment but inviting 48
new participants, half of which were intuitive decision-makers, and half were deliberative decision-makers.
Third part of this research: fMRI experiments with strongly and weakly masked cartoon clips and a medium
information load
Twenty-four participants were examined in the medium load experiment with strongly masked clips presented for unconscious en-
coding and 24 further participants were examined in the medium load experiment with weakly masked clips for conscious encoding.
Because only habitually intuitive decision-makers had provided evidence of successful subliminal encoding in part one and two of
this research, we restricted both fMRI experiments, i.e., the experiment on unconscious clip processing and the experiment on
conscious clip processing, to habitually intuitive decision-makers. All participants fulfilled the inclusion and exclusion criteria for
MRI. This MRI study was approved by the local ethics committee for human studies (Kantonale Ethikkomission Bern).
Experimental procedure
The MRI session started with a T1- weighted MRI sequence. Next, participants took the practice trials to become familiar with the
experimental task and procedure. Then, they performed the fMRI experiment that included 12 fMRI time-series that corresponded
to the 12 encoding-test runs. In each run, three clips were presented masked for encoding: one clip of the experimental condition,
one clip of control condition 1, and one clip of control condition 2. Each clip constituted one block in a block fMRI design. A two-min-
ute rest interval separated the encoding and test part within a run. The retrieval part of a run encompassed 30 retrieval trials, ten
retrieval trials per condition. Retrieval trials were presented in a rapid event-related fMRI design with a random jitter of 500 ms -
3000 ms between retrieval trials. The intervals between retrieval trials were filled with the presentation of a white fixation cross on
a gray background that participants were asked to look at.
MRI data acquisition
We ran the anatomical and functional image acquisition on a 3T Siemens Magnetom Trio whole-body scanner (Siemens Medical So-
lutions, Erlangen, Germany) with a 64-channel head coil. Anatomical T1-weighted image acquisition followed a 3D modified driven
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equilibrium Fourier transform pulse sequence (MDEFT108) with a spatial resolution of 13 13 1 mm3 (176 sagittal slices; time of repe-
tition (TR) = 7.93 ms; echo time (TE) = 2.49 ms; flip angle (FA) = 16; field of view (FOV) = 256 3 256 mm2). Functional T2*-weighted
multi-slice single-shot images were acquired using a blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) sensitive, interleaved simultaneous
multi-slice accelerated diffusion-weighted echo-planar imaging sequence with an accelerating factor of 3 and a spatial resolution
of 2 3 2 3 2 mm3 (60 transversal slices; TR = 1220 ms; TE = 30 ms; FA = 80; FOV = 192 3 192 mm2).
Subjective and objective measures of clip awareness
Subjective awareness measure
Participants scored the visibility of each cartoon clip immediately after its presentation on a 4-point perceptual awareness scale
(PAS;52) with the levels: 1) no awareness at all; 2) a feeling that something was present, either static or moving, 3) an impression
of the scene or animals, 4) a clear image of the scene and animals.
Objective awareness measure
An objective test of clip awareness was carried out at the end of a subliminal experimental session that featured strongly masked
clips. The objective awareness test was run to find out whether participants were able to consciously discern certain aspects of
the strongly masked cartoon clips. We re-used the same cartoon clips and animals that we had subliminally presented in the exper-
iment. There were 36 trials. Over the three conditions in the original experiment, we had presented each of the 18 scenes (e.g., un-
derwater scene, mountain scene, etc.) twice, thoughwith distinct sets of five animals. Now, we re-presented these same 18 scenes in
the objective awareness test, presenting each scene twice, to account for the 36 trials. In each cartoon clip, one single animal moved
across the scene, entering and leaving the central hiding place once, which amounted to a clip-duration of only 5.3 s. Clips were
presented in the same strongly masked fashion and with the same psychophysical set-up as during the experiment. The forced-
choice test followed the presentation of the strongly masked clip immediately (no exposure-test delay). For the forced-choice
test, participants were presented with the unmasked central hiding place and with two unmasked animals: the target animal and
a lure animal that had featured in the original experiment but not in the previously presented clip. Participants’ task was to decide
which of the two animals had featured in the preceding clip. Of the five animals presented in the original experiment along with a
certain scene, we randomly selected two animals, of which one constituted the target and the other the lure. The sequence of trials
was randomized anew for each individual participant. Instructions were direct in both this awareness test and in the original exper-
iment because participants knew from the outset that they would be presented with masked clips, whose visibility they were to rate
following presentation. The difference between the original experiment and this awareness test consisted in the processing demand
(temporal relational inference versus perception of one single animal), the encoding-test delay (minutes versus immediate), and stim-
ulus novelty (novel in the original experiment versus dejà-vu in the awareness test). Given the simplified clip version applied in the
awareness test, a lack of behavioral effects of conscious clip awareness would strongly speak to unconscious clip processing in
the original experiment.
Results of the objective awareness test
Part one of this research
We computed an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the performance index accuracy on the objective awareness test (i.e., percent-
age of correctly chosen target animals) and the between-subjects factors Information Load (low load, medium load, high load) and
Decision Style (intuitive/deliberative decision-makers). The intercept in the ANOVA was not above chance level (50%; F (1, 111) =
0.001, p = 0.98) and Decision Style had no significant influence on accuracy (FDS (1, 111) = 0.87, p = 0.35). We also calculated Bayes
Factors (BF) to estimate whether mean accuracy was at chance level and did not differ as a function of Decision Style.57 BFs were
calculated using a half-normal prior distribution with a mode of 0% (reflecting chance-level accuracy or no group-difference) and a
standard deviation of 5% (expected above chance accuracy or group difference in accuracy). If the reported effects in the main
experiment were due to conscious instead of unconscious processes, accuracy on the awareness tests shouldmatch the effect sizes
reported for the main experiment. To estimate the expected accuracy, we multiplied the pooled effect size for the difference in re-
action times following strong masking in intuitive decision-makers of all experiments (dz = 0.58) with the pooled standard deviation of
accuracy (SD = 8.53%) in the objective awareness test. This yielded a value of5%. Bayes Factors suggested that there is substan-
tial evidence for chance level performance (MAcc = 49.84%, SE = 0.80%, BF10 = 0.13), but only anecdotal and inconclusive evidence
for the absence of an effect of Decision Style (MDAcc = 1.29%, SE = 1.61, BF10 = 0.64). Post hoc t tests for each decision style group
and each level of Information Load against chance (50%) yielded no significant results, and most BFs favored the null assumption of
chance-level performance (Table S6).
Part two of this research (replication experiment with strong masking and a medium information load)
We computed an ANOVAwith the dependent variable accuracy on the objective awareness test (i.e., percentage of correctly chosen
target animals) and the between-subjects factor Decision Style. The intercept was not above chance level (50%; F (1, 46) = 1.133, p =
0.29); decision style had no significant influence on accuracy (F (1, 46) = 0.071, p = 0.79). Bayes Factors suggested that there is sub-
stantial evidence for chance level performance (MAcc = 48.61%, SE = 1.29%, BF10 = 0.13), but only anecdotal and inconclusive
evidence for the absence of an effect of Decision Style (MDAcc = 0.69%, SE = 2.61, BF10 = 0.56). Post hoc t tests for each decision
style group against chance level (50%) yielded no significant results (Table S6), and BFs suggested that there is substantial evidence
for the H0 (chance-level performance).
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Part three of this research (fMRI experiment with strong masking, a medium information load, and only participants
with an intuitive decision style)
Accuracy on the objective awareness test (i.e., percentage of correctly chosen target animals) was not significantly above chance
(Table S6), but the BF suggested that there is anecdotal evidence for above-chance accuracy.
QUANTIFICATION AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Statistical analyses of behavioral data
Behavioral datawere analyzedwith R (v4.0.2)109 in R-Studio (v1.1.447)110 running on aWindows 7 computer. ANOVASwere performed
using the function aov_ez() of the R-package afex (0.28-0.)100 Linear mixed models were estimated using the function lmer() of the
R-package lme4 (v1.1-23).101 Significance testing for linear mixed models was performed using the Anova() function provided by the
R-package lmerTest (v3.1-2).102 The R-package stats (4.0.2)109 provided the functions t-stats() for t tests and cor.test() for correlations.
Bayes Factors were calculated using a custom R-function provided by Baguley.55
All statistical tests were two-sided. The significance threshold was p < 0.05 if not indicated otherwise.
Control analyses with the behavioral data
In search of alternative explanations for the results obtained with strongly masked clips, we performed additional analyses that are
reported in the following sections.
Intuitive decision-makers displayed shorter reaction times (RT) for correct versus incorrect retrieval responses following their pre-
sentation with strongly masked cartoon clips. We used the median rather than the mean of individual RTs because RTs were skewed
to the right at the single-trial level. We tried to determine whether biases in the stimulus material or a response bias on the partici-
pants’ side may have generated shorter reactions in correctly versus incorrectly responded retrieval trials.
Biased stimulus material?
The cartoon clips were identical for all participants across all experiments. Hence, the order of entrances and exits of the five animals
featuring in a specific cartoon clip was kept constant (e.g., underwater scenewith shipwreck: turtle enters, piranha enters, turtle exits,
shark enters, ...; see Figure 2). Therefore, the correct retrieval responses for specific animal pairs remained the same across exper-
iments and participants for a given cartoon clip (e.g., the correct response to the question whether the piranha and the shark had
hidden simultaneously in the shipwreck was ‘simultaneous’; see Figure 2). If participants strongly preferred one response over the
other for a subset of animal pairs due to stimulus-inherent properties and if the preferred response happened to be correct and
the response latency short, then the significant reaction time difference could be driven by a stimulus bias. To determine whether
a stimulus bias contributed to the reaction time difference, we aggregated participants’ responses by animal pair (e.g., turtle-piranha,
turtle-shark, piranha-shark,...) for the 360 animal pairs. This was done separately for the group of intuitive and the group of deliber-
ative decision-makers. We combined all responses obtained in the first part of this research (low load, medium load, high load) and in
the second part of this research (replication experiment withmedium load). Responses obtained in the third part of this research (fMRI
experiment) were excluded because no deliberative decision-makers took part in the fMRI experiment. We computed the following
parameters for each animal pair: 1) Response Accuracy (ratio of participants that gave a correct response); 2) ‘Simultaneous’-rate
(ratio of ‘simultaneous’ responses to the question of whether the two animals had hidden simultaneously inside the hiding place);
3) Bias (ratio of participants who gave repeatedly the same response irrespective of whether it was ‘simultaneous’ or ‘not simulta-
neous’; 0.5 means no bias and 1.0 means all participants gave the same response); 4) Mean of ranked reaction times (RTs were
rank-normalized within each participant prior to aggregation to make them comparable between participants). On average, there
was a bias toward ‘not simultaneous’ responses (FIntercept(1,359) = 124.94, p < 0.001, h
2
r = 0.258). This bias tended to be larger
for responses sampled from deliberative (mean ‘simultaneous’-ratio = 44.98%, standard error = 0.52%) than intuitive decision-
makers (mean ‘simultaneous’-ratio = 46.29%, standard error = 0.51%): FDS(1,359) = 3.32, p = 0.069, h
2
r = 0.009. Importantly, neither
Bias nor ‘Simultaneous’-rate were significantly associated with Response Accuracy or with the mean of ranked RT for intuitive and
deliberative decision-makers (all jrj < = 0.094, all p > 0.079). Linear mixed models with random intercepts for animal pairs confirmed
that Decision Style had no significant impact on the influence of Bias or ‘Simultaneous’-rate on either Accuracy or RTs (all p > 0.285
for the interaction between Decision Style and Bias or ‘Simultaneous’-rate). Therefore, it is unlikely that the RT difference between
correct and incorrect retrieval responses observed in the group of intuitive decision-makers is due to biased stimulusmaterial. Never-
theless, we assessed whether the reported RT difference would disappear if biased items were excluded from the data analysis. To
test this possibility, we first determined the cumulative binomial probability for obtaining a similar or larger Bias under the null
assumption that responses would be equally distributed for each animal pair. A small probability (i.e., < 5%) indicates that responses
were significantly biased for a specific pair. We stepwise excluded biased pairs, first those with a cumulative binomial probability p <
5% (i.e., those that were significantly biased at an alpha level of 5%), then all pairs with p < 10%, p < 15%, p < 20%, and p < 25%.We
thus increased the alpha-value with each step, i.e., the level at which items were said to be significantly biased, thereby excluding
more and more items with less extreme biases. For each exclusion criterion, we computed and plotted the mean RT-difference plus
the 95% confidence interval (see Figure S3). The original values obtained before exclusion of any stimulus pairs are plotted at Exclu-
sion Criterion = 0%. The reported RT difference did not systematically decay, which strongly suggests that the RT differences of intu-
itive decision-makers at retrieval following strong masking were not due to stimulus-inherent biases.
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If intuitive decision makers would systematically prefer one response over the other (e.g., responding mostly ‘simultaneous’) and if
reaction times were systematically shorter for one type of response than the other, then these participant-inherent tendencies might
lead to systematic RT differences between correct and incorrect retrieval responses and could hence explain the retrieval results
following the watching of strongly masked clips. To test for a participant-inherent response bias, we analyzed participants’ response
biases across all experiments with strongly masked clips. The bias was measured as the ratio of ‘simultaneous’ responses to the
question whether two animals had hidden simultaneously in a clip. Results showed that the participants were biased toward ‘not
simultaneous’ responses (% of ‘simultaneous’ responses was MBIAS = 46.17%, SEBIAS = 0.83%, t(116) = 4.604, p < 0.001, dZ =
0.426 for the first part of this research, MBIAS = 43.44%, SEBIAS = 1.58%, t(47) = 4.162, p < 0.001, dZ = 0.601 for the second
part of this research, and MBIAS = 48.65%, SEBIAS = 1.48%, t(23) = 0.912 p = 0.371, dZ = 0.186 for the fMRI experiment). This
bias toward ‘not simultaneous’ responses was not significantly influenced by Decision Style (FDS(1,111) = 0.37, p = 0.542, h
2
r =
0.003, for the first part of this research; FDS(1,46) = 0.01, p = 0.928, h
2
r < 0.001 for the second part of this research). Therefore,
the significant difference in reaction times between correct and incorrect retrieval responses in intuitive decision-makers is not
due to a unique response bias in intuitive decision-makers.
Next, we tried to find out how reaction latencies were influenced by the type of response: ‘simultaneous’ versus ‘not simulta-
neous’. To this aim, we aggregated per participant the reaction times for Response Accuracy (correct response, incorrect
responses) and for Response Type (‘simultaneous’ versus ‘not simultaneous’). In the first part of this research, Response Type
had no significant effect on reaction time and did not interact with any other factor (Accuracy, Load, Decision Style, all p >
0.12). Importantly, we observed a significant interaction between Accuracy and Decision Style after controlling for Response
Type (FDSxACC(1,111) = 5.00, p = 0.027, h
2
r = 0.041). Hence, intuitive decision-makers gave correct versus incorrect ‘simultaneous’
and ‘not simultaneous’ retrieval responses faster irrespective of Response Type ‘simultaneous’ or ‘not simultaneous’ (FACC(1,59) =
7.69, p = 0.007, h2r = 0.115). These findings are consistent with the main effect of decision style on RT differences reported in the
results section. We obtained similar results for the data collected in the second part of this research (replication experiment):
Response Type had no significant influence on reaction time and did not interact with any other factor (Accuracy, Decision Style,
all p > 0.07). We observed a significant interaction between Accuracy and Decision Style after controlling for Response Type
(FDSxACC(1,46) = 5.67, p = 0.022, h
2
r = 0.110). Hence, intuitive decision-makers gave correct versus incorrect ‘simultaneous’
and ‘not simultaneous’ retrieval responses faster irrespective of Response Type ‘simultaneous’ or ‘not simultaneous’
(FACC(1,23) = 4.88, p = 0.037, h
2
r = 0.175). In the third part of this research (fMRI experiment), both Response Type (FTYPE(1,23) =
4.39, p = 0.047, h2r = 0.160) and Accuracy (FACC(1,23) = 4.31, p = 0.049, h
2
r = 0.158) influenced reaction time significantly but these
two factors did not interact (FTYPExACC(1,23) = 1.02, p = 0.324, h
2
r = 0.042): Participants responded faster in correct versus incor-
rect retrieval trials and - independently of this effect - they also responded faster when giving a ‘not simultaneous’ versus a ‘simul-
taneous’ response. In conclusion, these additional analyses suggest that the intuitive decision-makers’ RT differences between
correct and incorrect retrieval trials result from the intuitive decision-makers’ implicit memory of the temporal relational inferences
formed when watching the strongly masked clips.
Statistical analyses of fMRI data
We ran the preprocessing and the statistical analyses of the functional MRI volumes using the software SPM12 (Wellcome Depart-
ment of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK). Functional volumes were slice-time corrected, realigned to the mean volume by rigid
body transformation, coregistered to the participants’ anatomical volume, normalized to the MNI305 T1 template, and finally
smoothed with a 6 mm (FWHM) isotropic Gaussian kernel. We performed first-level analyses using a general linear model that
modeled the fMRI time-series as a sequence of events convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF) pro-
vided by SPM12. The encoding time-series was modeled using three regressors of interest (replicated across the 12 encoding
sessions) that corresponded 1) to the 12 clips of the experimental condition, 2) to the 12 clips of control condition 1, and 3) to
the 12 clips of control condition 2. We modeled the signal changes during the encoding of a clip using a block design with block
duration of 22.1 s.
The retrieval time-series was modeled using four regressors of interest (replicated across the 12 retrieval sessions) that corre-
sponded to the responses given at test, namely 1) correct responses given in the experimental condition, 2) incorrect responses given
in the experimental condition, 3) all responses given in control condition 1, and 4) all responses given in control condition 2. In addi-
tion, the retrieval time-series included 3 regressors of no interest that corresponded to the retrieval cues (cues are images of the hid-
ing places). These cues were provided before retrieval testing to remind participants of the respective clip in order to facilitate their
retrieval of inferences formed when watching that clip. We modeled the signal changes during retrieval using a rapid event-related
design (duration: 0 s) for regressors of interest. The regressors of no interest referred to blocks of 5 s.
The general linear models computed for both the encoding and retrieval time-series included six nuisance regressors for the six
movement parameters plus a constant covariate representing the session-specific mean over scans.
Due to a rapid TR of 1220 ms, combined with a 64-channel head coil, functional images exhibited a drop in signal intensity
around the center of the brain. This is a general physical drawback of multichannel acquisitions. The signal collapses toward
the center of the brain. Importantly, affected regions of interest (hippocampus and basal temporal lobe) retained a reasonable
signal-to-noise ratio of > 10 (hippocampus) and > 4 (basal temporal lobe) in the participant with the largest drop in signal intensity.
However, the implicit statistical masking of SPM under default parameters led to the exclusion of large parts of these regions of
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interest from the analysis. Therefore, we constructed a custom explicit inclusive statistical mask, based on the implicit mask that
replaced missing areas with normalized automated anatomical labeling (AAL) areas. Additionally, white matter was excluded from
this custom explicit mask. To this aim, we segmented the average normalized structural (T1) image per group and experiment
(experiment with strong masking; experiment with weak masking) using SPM’s built-in segmentation function. The resulting white
matter tissue map was then inverted and multiplied with the custom explicit inclusive statistical mask to create the final custom
explicit mask.
We computed second-level analyses for group statistics using one-sample t tests on first-level contrasts. We included one group-
level regressor to obtain brain-behavior correlations, which are particularly informative because they isolate brain activity that is
directly related to the task-relevant encoding- and retrieval-operations rather than other, non-instructed concurrent mental activity
such as rumination. We modeled the encoding and retrieval of strongly and weakly masked clips focusing on four brain-behavior
correlations. Tomodel encoding, we used first-level contrasts between the experimental condition and control condition 1. Tomodel
retrieval, we used first-level contrasts between correct and incorrect retrieval responses in the experimental condition. As a group-
level behavioral regressor, we used retrieval accuracy (% correct responses) in the experimental condition when clips were weakly
masked and the RT difference between incorrect and correct retrieval responses in the experimental condition when clips were
strongly masked. We set the intensity threshold to a p value of 0.001, uncorrected, and the minimal cluster size threshold k to 10 vox-
els.111 For the region of interest, the hippocampus, we masked voxels inclusively using the SPM Neuromorphometrics Mask for the
bilateral hippocampus and set the intensity threshold to a p value of 0.005, uncorrected, with a cluster-size threshold k of 5 voxels.
The reasons for the liberal hippocampal threshold were 1) the a priori hypothesis of hippocampal involvement in thememory task and
2) the wish to reduce Type II errors associated with the notoriously weak fMRI signal changes in the hippocampus, which are even
weaker in protocols with subliminal presentations.48,49
To uncover commonalities in brain activity underlying the conscious and unconscious encoding and retrieval of temporal relational
inferences, we computed conjunction analyses against the global null hypothesis.112 Briefly, we took T-maps of the contrasts of









for region of interest (hippocampus) analyses. Then, we computed the minimum-T im-
age between the newly thresholded T-maps for weakly and strongly masked clips to obtain conjunctionmaps for encoding as well as
for retrieval. The resulting conjunction clusters were considered significant at the extent thresholds of k = 10 (whole brain) and k = 5
(region of interest: hippocampus).
We examined whether the correlations used in the conjunction analyses were of statistically different magnitude when cartoon
clips were consciously versus unconsciously processed. Hence, we compared the strength of correlations between consciousness
conditions. We focused on hippocampal results obtained when correlating the encoding contrasts with retrieval performance and
when correlating the retrieval contrasts with retrieval performance. We used the R package ‘cocor’103 and set the confidence level
to 0.95. The null hypothesis predicated that the two correlations are equal (null value = 0).
Outlier control: We assessed whether the computed conjunction analyses of correlations included correlations with outliers (see
Figure 4). For outlier control, we ran leverage- and Cook’s distance tests using the MATLAB function plotDiagnostics. We chose the
default recommended critical maximum values Lcrit (leverage test) = 2
p
N, where p is the number of coefficients and N is the number of








, where N is the number of observations and Di is Cook’s distance of obser-
vation i. For the correlation of the retrieval contrast with retrieval performance in the unconscious condition, these two tests indicated
that the top right data point in Figure 4 was indeed an outlier (L = 0.321 > Lcrit = 0.167; D = 2.928 > Dcrit = 0.455). When we ran this
conjunction analysis again excluding this outlier, two of the three hippocampal clusters remained significant. These two clusters were
located in the left anterior hippocampus (correlation plotted in Figure 4: peak at MNI =28,22,20: t = 1.97, p = 0.006, k = 26) and
in the right posterior hippocampus (shown on sagittal brain slice in Figure 4: peak at MNI = 32, 34, 6: t = 1.88, p = 0.037, k = 5).
However, the right anterior hippocampal cluster failed to reach significance (shown on the coronal and sagittal brain slice in Figure 4:
peak at MNI = 34, 22, 18).
For the correlation of the encoding contrast with retrieval performance in the unconscious condition, the leverage- and Cook’s dis-
tance tests disagreed on which data points were potential outliers. The leverage-test classified the same top right data point in Fig-
ure 4 as potential outlier (L = 0.321 > Lcrit = 0.167; D = 0.114 < Dcrit = 0.133), while the Cook’s distance test classified the top left data
point as potential outlier (L = 0.09 < Lcrit = 0.167; D = 0.199 > Dcrit = 0.133). We ran this conjunction analysis again excluding both
potential outliers. The right posterior hippocampal cluster depicted in Figure 4 remained statistically significant (peak at MNI = 30,
38, 4; t = 2.28, p = 0.017, k = 10).
Besides the commonalities in brain activity across consciousness conditions, we were also interested in differences in brain
activity between consciousness conditions. To identify differences in brain activity underlying the conscious versus unconscious
encoding and retrieval of relational inferences, we compared first-level encoding contrasts and also retrieval contrasts between con-
sciousness conditions, i.e., between the encoding of strongly versus weakly masked clips and between the retrieval of strongly
versus weakly masked clips. To this aim, we used an independent t test at the second level. For encoding, we used first-level con-
trasts between the experimental condition and control condition 1. For retrieval, we used first-level contrasts between correct and
incorrect retrieval responses in the experimental condition.
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Additional fMRI results obtained in the individual experiments
Experiment with strongly masked clips for unconscious encoding and retrieval
Encoding with strong masking: In the encoding fMRI time-series, we used a block design for the presentation of the clips and con-
trasted the experimental condition with control condition 1. We then correlated this contrast with the retrieval performance (i.e., RT
difference between incorrect and correct retrieval responses) between subjects to reveal BOLD signal that is associated with uncon-
scious temporal relational inference and associated with retrieval success. This correlation yielded only two significant results and
both results were located in the right inferior frontal gyrus (BA47; 51 voxels, peak at MNI 38, 46, 2; T = 4.77, puncor < 0.001;
BA47; 10 voxels, peak at MNI 50, 40, 16; T = 3.85; puncor < 0.001) (Table S2). There was no significant result for the hippocampus.
We would like to mention that two hippocampal activity increases appeared below threshold – one in the left anterior hippocampus
(5 voxels, peak atMNI26,14,24; T = 2.29; puncor = 0.016) and the other in the right posterior hippocampus (3 voxels, peak atMNI
30,38,4; T = 2.10; puncor = 0.024). This is interesting because these same hippocampal areas increased their activity significantly
during the unconscious retrieval of inferences and/or appeared in the conjunction analyses.
The inverse correlation yielded no significant results (Table S2).
Retrieval following strong masking: In the retrieval fMRI time-series, we used a rapid event-related design that allowed contrasting
correct versus incorrect retrieval responses given in the experimental condition. We computed the contrast of these correct versus
incorrect retrieval responses and correlated this contrast with retrieval performance (i.e., RT difference between incorrect and correct
retrieval responses) between subjects. Positive correlations were situated in the right inferior frontopolar cortex (BA10; 29 voxels,
peak at MNI 26, 60, 8; T = 5.38, puncor < 0.001), the left posterior cingulate gyrus (BA23; 26 voxels, peak at MNI 6, 32, 34;
T = 5.87, puncor < 0.001), and in the left anterior hippocampus (5 voxels, peak at MNI 30, 16, 22; T = 3.39, puncor < 0.005) (Table
S2). The inverse correlation yielded no significant results (Table S2).
Experiment with weakly masked clips for conscious encoding and retrieval
Encoding with weak masking: In this encoding fMRI time-series, we used a block design for the presentation of the clips and con-
trasted the experimental condition with control condition 1. We then correlated this contrast with retrieval performance (i.e., retrieval
accuracy) between subjects to reveal BOLD signal that is associated with conscious temporal relational inference and associated
with retrieval success. This correlation yielded several significant results: in the right middle temporal gyrus (BA21; 38 voxels,
peak at MNI 50, 14,32; T = 4.32, puncor < 0.001); in the left anterior thalamus (11 voxels, peak at MNI8,16, 18, T = 4.73, puncor <
0.001); in the right pulvinar nuclei of the thalamus (10 voxels, peak at MNI 24,32, 4, T = 3.97, puncor < 0.001); in the right intraparietal
sulcus (BA40; 23 voxels, peak at MNI 32,32, 46, T = 4.01, puncor < 0.001); and in the right posterior hippocampus (17 voxels, peak at
MNI 24, 36, 4; T = 3.31, puncor < 0.005) (Table S3). The inverse correlation yielded no significant results (Table S3).
Retrieval following weak masking: In this retrieval fMRI time-series, we used a rapid event-related design that allowed contrasting
correct versus incorrect retrieval responses given in the experimental condition. We computed the contrast of these correct versus
incorrect retrieval responses and correlated this contrast with retrieval performance (i.e., retrieval accuracy) between subjects. Sig-
nificant positive correlations were situated in many left and right lateral temporal semantic storage sites (e.g., left inferior temporal
gyrus, BA20; 132 voxels, peak at MNI 60, 20, 34; T = 6.52; right middle temporal gyrus, BA20/21; 211 voxels, peak at MNI
56, 35, 24; T = 5.83; puncor < 0.001). Additional positive correlations were located in the left middle frontal gyrus (BA8; 37 voxels,
peak atMNI18, 34, 38; T = 4.24, puncor < 0.001), in bilateral areas of the insula, in bilateral areas of the superior occipital gyrus (BA19)
and in the right posterior hippocampus (6 voxels, peak at MNI 32, 38, 6; T = 3.23, puncor < 0.005) (for complete results see Table
S3). The inverse correlation yielded no significant results.
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